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THE IMPLICATIONS OF EU ADMITTANCE OF TURKEY ON TURKISH-EU RELATIONS AND TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS
Turkish modernization processes began over two centuries ago and acquired new momentum with the founding of the Turkish Republic. The republican reforms undertaken by Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's founding President, and his colleagues aimed at creating a modern, secular state. The fundamental ambition of the new republic was the attainment of a level of "contemporary civilization," a formulation for European civilization. Therefore, the revolutionary regime in Ankara pursued the country's integration into the European political order since its inception.
The application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late 1950s was, therefore, part of the historically established process of seeking "Europeanness." In 1963
Turkey signed an association agreement with the EEC. The agreement held the promise of eventual membership for Turkey after conditions for such a development were fulfilled.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey joined the institutional framework of the Western alliance, becoming a member of the Council of Europe. It also joined all the organizations that helped shape the European order in the postwar period. In time, as the Cold War international system finally took shape, Turkey became part of the security architecture of the transatlantic alliance as a member of NATO. However, in my opinion, the end of the Cold
War led the EU to turn its back on Turkey since the security dimension of the transatlantic alliance was no longer of primary importance.
With the painful experiences of September 11 the twenty-first century world order is being shaped over again. Turkey's significant role as a mediator of civilizations is now receiving increased attention. Therefore, Turkey's accession to the EU has acquired a complicated strategic dimension. The decision about the Turkish accession to the EU is of a strategic dimension both in security terms and in terms of fulfilling the promise of a multicultural Europe.
This dimension of the strategic calculation suggests that the decision about Turkey now has an audience that is larger than just Turkey itself. The relevant audience now includes the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Turkey's accession would offer considerable benefits both to the EU and to Turkey. For the Union, the unique geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans, the wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond, its importance for the security of Europe's energy supplies and its political, economic and military weight would be great assets.
Moreover, as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the EU, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe's relations with the Islamic world. 1 This paper examines the challenges and opportunities that would arise with Turkey's full membership of the EU, and the implications of Turkish membership for the future of both Turkey and Europe. It also addresses the implications of Turkish accession on Turkish-US relations, and how they would change.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EU-Turkey relations have a long history and the discussion about Turkey's entry is not new. In fact, it goes all the way back to the early 1960s. In 1963, Turkey and the EEC entered into an Association Agreement containing a membership perspective. 2 In connection with an association agreement, Turkey was promised membership once the country met the criteria.
Despite its geographic location, the EU considered Turkey part of Europe, mainly because the Cold War made Turkey a strategically important country. In 1987, Turkey kept the EU to its word and formally applied for membership. The EU Commission, however, assessed that, at that time, Turkey did not meet the membership criteria. 3 Instead of accession negotiations, Turkey was offered a number of initiatives such as a customs union in order to prepare the country for entry. In 1995, a customs union was formed.
At the 1999 summit in Helsinki the EU decided that Turkey was a candidate for accession States to open accession negotiations with Turkey, and announced that "In view of the overall progress of reforms attained, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened." 6 On the occasion of the progress report and recommendation of the Commission issued on 6 October, Mr. Romano
Prodi, the President of the European Commission said that "A Europe that is sure of itself, has a Constitution and strong institutions and policies, is returning to economic growth and is based on a strong model of peace, prosperity and solidarity has nothing to fear from the integration of The decision also states that "Turkey must sign a customs accord extending to all EU members, including Greek Cyprus. The accord must be signed by the start of entry talks, proposed for October 2005. Turkey must continue with political and economic reforms. Some safeguards may remain over migration of workers from Turkey." 10 It will mean granting effective recognition to the Greek Cypriot government, but gives Turkey more time to sell the idea to its people. The internationally recognized southern part of Cyprus is an EU member, but Turkey had previously insisted it would not bow to demands to recognize the country, calling the issue a "red line".
The ambiguous decision of the EU has caused intensive debates and unease in Turkish public opinion. While the government is exerting severe efforts to make public the details of that decision, many of Turkish elites describe the decision as "discrimination". Mumtaz Soysal, independent member of the Turkish Parliament and political commentator writes, "The Commission has been discriminating in its evaluation of Turkey's progress towards EU membership. It has not set the same criteria as for other candidate countries. They say it is not just for Turkey, but the new criteria begin with Turkey. And it is also clear it will be an unending process. If Europe wants to prolong the process that long, then Turkey might take its future into its own hands." 11 In that case, negotiations will be slow, member-states will be reluctant to open and close chapters including 31 main topics for the accession process, the process probably will take more than a decade, and the Turks will become extremely frustrated.
Turkey's National Security Council, which has been transformed into a civilian think tank, called on the European Union not to impose any conditions on Ankara when it starts membership talks with the bloc next year. "The council notes the importance of carrying out negotiations without any discrimination or conditions against Turkey," it said in a statement.
12
The National Security Council welcomed the firm date set by European leaders for the start of accession talks, but underlined that the summit conclusions also contained some "negative elements".
In reality, the decision is an expression of a balancing act in which the Commission attempts to maintain the reform momentum in Turkey while at the same time avoiding alienating the public opinion in the member states. Nevertheless what really matters is what happens afterwards. It would only be the starting point for a long process, and will not automatically lead to accession. The objective would be Turkey becoming a full member of the EU, but reaching that goal will depend on the efforts made by Turkey and by the EU. And there is still much to be done.
IMPLICATIONS OF TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP ON TURKISH-EU RELATIONS
Turkey's accession to the EU will present both the Union and Turkey itself not only with serious challenges, but also with considerable opportunities and benefits. The necessary preparations for accession will last well into the next decade. The EU will evolve over this period, and Turkey should change even more radically.
THE OPPORTUNITIES
There can be no doubt that Turkey's accession to the EU presents both the Union and Turkey itself not only with serious challenges, but also with considerable opportunities and benefits. Moreover, the costs of rejecting Turkey's request to join the Union and other negative consequences must also be taken into consideration.
Global Politics
The advantages of Turkey's membership for the EU are closely related to the future vision of the EU, which remain a matter of intense debate within the Union. At a time when the European Union is set to assume greater responsibility in world politics, Turkish accession will considerably strengthen the Union's capabilities as a foreign policy actor. Turkey's membership will contribute not only to the maintenance of stability and peace in the wider Europe, but also to the spread of European values to the region and beyond. Turkey's entry to the EU will open new horizons in the foreign relations of the EU and help provide solutions. Turkey's membership will give fresh impetus to the EU's relations with the countries of the Middle East and Caucasian regions, which have not always been easy. The addition of Turkey will give "continental weight"
and greater strategic depth to the EU's foreign policy through greater political, economic, diplomatic and military clout.
Regional Stability and Peace
Its location at the centre of the "Eurasian" geography makes Turkey a key strategic ally.
Its close historic ties and more recent experience in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, provide Turkey with an historical and cultural resource, which, together with its strategic location and influence have already enabled it to make positive contributions to the shaping of the EU policies towards these sensitive regions.
For example, Russia is today among the biggest trade partners of Turkey, and thanks to its linguistic and cultural ties with the five Turkic Republics of Central Asia, Turkey has been able to access that region first and most easily at both political and economic levels.
In the Middle East, an area of special interest to Europe both for historical reasons and because of its impact on European security, the EU has much to gain in profile and status. Turkey has as much experience in the reconstruction of the crisis regions as it has in the prevention of regional conflicts. Turkish officials have taken part in every international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, the Middle East and Georgia.
Turkey took over the command of ISAF in Afghanistan from Britain and successfully carried out this difficult task. A former Foreign Minister of Turkey is currently NATO's civilian representative in Afghanistan. With its entry to the EU, the stabilizing role Turkey has been playing in these regions will be further strengthened, and help the EU to deploy greater "soft" as well as "hard"
power. The significance of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and Asia due to its strategically important location can hardly be overestimated. In order to realize the European Common Turkey's membership will prove both that cultural differences can indeed coexist and that
Security
Islam and modernity can be compatible, and constitute an effective answer from the West to the concept of a Christian-Muslim conflict. Turkish accession will show that Christians and Muslims can live together under the same European roof, within the same political and economic union.
Turkey's membership will end criticism that the EU is a "Christian Club", and accusations of racism and thus enhance the Union's own Charter of Fundamental Rights, now enshrined in Part II of the draft Constitutional Treaty. 15 Beyond the borders of an enlarged EU Turkish membership will also have a positive impact on views in the Islamic world. 
Economy
In addition to enhancing the Union's role in the political and security field, Turkey could add in no small way to Europe's economic weight in the world. The country is large and has substantial resources. Turkey's population is young and dynamic, and its economy is the fastest-growing on the continent. Europe faces severe problems in the coming decades unless it can produce more dynamic growth, and replenish its declining population. With a population more than seventy million at present, and its purchasing power expected steadily to increase, Turkey's potential as a market for goods from EU member states will gain in importance.
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline following the emergence of the 
THE CHALLENGES
When the question of Turkish membership to the EU is discussed, these factors turn into a major challenge, raising anxieties and resistance in many parts of Europe. Turkey is big, poor, not European enough, and its borders to Iran, Iraq and Syria are dangerous to be borders of the EU. All these concerns are negligible when considering Turkey's potential membership in the EU. Instead, the beginning of negotiations for EU accession will provide a lot of chances for both Turkey and Europe.
The impact of Turkey's size
The first classical argument against Turkish membership is the size of the country. Critics argue that, with more than 70 million people Turkey will put the EU labor market under an unacceptable pressure; with its large population Turkey will dominate the work in the EU institutions, and alter decision-making mechanisms fundamentally.
With its large population, will Turkey dominate the work force in the EU? It is correct that Turkey will be the biggest country in the EU, but Turkey's large population does not constitute as big a problem as has been claimed. Already nearly 71 million, it will reach 82 million in 2015
and stabilize at that level. Turkey's birth rate has sharply fallen over the years. The total fertility rate (average children per woman) stands at 2.5, down from 3.5 in the 1970s, and is expected to decline further as economic prosperity increases. This trend is also supported by Turkey's population growth rate which has fallen to 1.4% according to the latest UN figures.
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For the EU, whose population will have reached almost to 570 million with the entry of the Balkan countries, a population of 71 million will amount only to a minority of slightly over 14 per cent on accession. When the new Constitutional Treaty is adopted, a majority in the Council will require that at least 50 per cent of the member countries vote in favor of a proposition, and that these countries constitute 60 per cent of the EU's total population. 17 This means that Turkey will have no greater weight than Denmark in the first case, while population-wise it will have the same significance as Germany." 18 It is misleading to argue that Turkey will alone affect the decision-making mechanisms of the EU when well over 80 per cent of decisions are made by compromise and where qualified majority voting has largely replaced unanimity. 19 Current problems in decision-making in the EU must be solved even if Turkey does not join the Union. In this respect, it will be easier for
Turkey to take its place in an EU with a new and fair system of voting.
With 71 million people, will Turkey put the EU labor market under an unacceptable pressure? This view, frequently used by those anti-Turkey circles in order to create fear and anxiety about Turkey's EU membership, is not based in any way on any research or scientific study. Although the country has lived through considerable population growth, the situation is not radically different since the EU made the membership promise in 1963. In other words: The argument cannot suddenly justify a policy shift.
There is a populist argument that too many Turks would emigrate to Germany and other EU countries. A study by the European Commission on the migration from Spain, Portugal, and Greece shows that the will to leave the home country is not affected by the right of free movement in the EU. 20 However, given the current socio-economic conditions in Turkey, especially the wealth gap between the east and the west parts of the country, this argument may be seen as reasonable. In the first decade of full membership it can be expected that there will be some low-income people immigrations to Europe from the eastern part of Turkey. But there will be agreements to restrict free-movement for an initial period after accession similar to those with Poland. In this initial period Turkey must take the required economic and social precautions and the EU should contribute to Turkey in tackling this issue. Nobody likes to leave the home country if they see a perspective for a better future at home.
Independent European Think Tanks assess that only between 2.5 and 3.0 million will leave their country during the first 15 years of eventual Turkish membership of the EU. 21 These figures correspond to some 0.5 per cent of the EU's total population in 2025. Even with free access, this will hardly create a flood. In parallel with Turkey's success in stabilizing its economy in its harmonization process with the EU and increasing the living standards of its citizens, the probability of immigration abroad can be expected to decline further. On the other hand, the need for Turkish workers might well emerge once again to close the workforce gap as in the past, as a result of the demographic developments in Europe.
Turkey will have a big advantage over other member states due to its young and continually better-educated population. At the time of a Turkish accession to the EU, Germany and other EU states will begin to feel their demographic over-aging more drastically. Young Turkish employees will then be more than welcome in these states to replace demographic losses in the workforce.
The impact of Turkey's poorness
The second argument is that Turkey is too poor. When compared to European memberstate's standards, Turkey is still a poor country, and 35 per cent of the population is employed in agriculture. In addition, the country is characterized by a major wealth gap, -especially in the east, where the GDP per capita is not more than 10 percent of the income in the rich regions in the west of the country. Therefore, it must be a priority for Turkey to narrow the economic divide between its regions. It is expected that the opening of negotiations will give a strong boost to the Turkish economy, improving the country's comparative position with EU countries and in particular with the new members. Nonetheless, the fear that a Turkish membership would become too expensive for the EU is not justified. Calculations show that Turkey will not receive more EU assistance per capita as the ten new EU members are receiving today. 24 By the time of accession to the EU it is estimated that per capita national income will have exceeded USD 10,000. 25 So Turkey will take its place inside Europe as a young, dynamic, rapidly developing and large market well able to stand on its own feet. This large market will have become much more prosperous, it will have adapted its infrastructure to that of the EU and it should have enjoyed a much increased flow of foreign investment. Its membership will bring substantial added value and boost the economic power of the European Union in the world.
Trade is the common foundation of the European economy. Turkey's membership will immediately add a population of about 70 millions to the EU with high consumption of contemporary goods and services, a direct advantage to existing EU exporters as many have already discovered within the EU-Turkey customs union. As a full participant in the EU's internal market, with all its advantages and obligations, Turkey will be a prize asset.
Turkey's economic contribution to the EU will encompass the entire region. Turkey is located at a key focal point for the increasingly important energy, transportation, and communication networks that link the East to Europe. Aiming for leadership in foreign trade within its natural geographic zone, Turkey has developed extensive trade relations with the countries of Central Asia, the 13-nation Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization. Turkey will thus be able to contribute both to the EU's access to these markets and to the procurement of raw materials and inputs that are of vital importance for the European economy.
Not European enough
The third argument is that Turkey is not European enough. Some European critics assert that cultural differences are an obstacle for Turkey's EU membership. This view, which discriminates between Turkish and European cultures, and argues that it is impossible to reconcile the two, contradicts the fundamental philosophy of the EU, which seeks integration 27 With the beginning of the reform process Turkey has undergone profound changes. It has fulfilled the political Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. The security trials were dissolved, the role of the military was restrained and Turkey finally played a constructive role during the negotiations over Cyprus. Minority rights were also significantly strengthened. It is now possible to watch TV programs in the Kurdish, Arabic, Bosnian, and Tcherkessian language.
Located on the Mediterranean rim, Turkey occupies a reconciliatory stance between
Muslim and European societies and reflects this reconciliatory structure through centuries of inherent versatility. The characteristic of Turkey in being both a Muslim and a European culture has been strongly established throughout the centuries, making it impossible today to make a black and white choice between the two. The existence of both of these elements in Turkish culture increases its potential to be a bridge between the two worlds of cultural life. Thus, with
Islam being the second largest religion in Europe after Christianity today, Turkey's fullmembership should help to reconcile religious and cultural differences by sharing and demonstrating complementary identities.
In the new world order where the idea of a "clash of civilizations" is intensely debated, Turkey's membership of the EU will demonstrate to the rest of the world that states uniting within the framework of common values are able to melt their cultural differences in the same pot and reinforce cultural plurality. This fact is compatible with the principle of "union in diversity" stated in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe.
The impact of Turkey's geographical location
The fourth argument is, with its geographical location, whether Turkey at all is a part of Europe. If Turkey becomes a member, the EU will become neighbors with Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Since Turkey has not changed its place on the map since 1963, geography cannot be used as a credible "no argument" in 2004. From a geographical perspective, in addition to having no clear eastern border, neither can Europe's southern borders be defined in definite terms. Some of the failure to define these borders is based on fear of the financial cost. After all, the EU has always determined the borders of the EU on the basis of politics, not geography. The countries that meet the criteria can join. In addition, Turkey is already a member of a range of European organizations, from NATO to the Council of Europe.
The idea that the EU will be affected more by regional instability when it becomes neighbors with the Middle East is groundless. In a globalizing world, incidents in all regionswhether distant or near-already have an impact on Europe. And essentially, Europe has long been neighbors with the region through Turkey's longstanding membership of NATO, which includes the obligation of immediate NATO intervention in the case of an attack on a member country. Such a continuing and dramatic guarantee would be neither exceeded nor weakened by membership of the EU.
Turkey's membership will politically draw the EU closer to the region, free from the imperial legacy of some of its member states, and facilitating the Union's contributions to peace and stability in the region. The security risk that the developments in the Middle East might pose to Europe will thus be reduced, not increased. Turkey's accession to the EU is an unprecedented chance both for the country to fulfill its potential as a successful modern democracy in the Muslim world and for the West to strengthen a precious ally in the fight against terrorism, deepen its commitment to diversity, and foster liberalization in the Islamic world.
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This region is the birthplace of civilizations, the nursery of agriculture and trade, geographically the cradle of the three monotheistic religions including Christianity, and contains the most critical energy resources of the world. Taking into account the democratic, social and economic development which the region's countries should achieve during the next two or three decades with the help of Turkey's contribution thanks to its unique identity and position, Europe's direct involvement through neighborhood of the region will be one of the most important benefits of Turkish accession for the EU.
IMPLICATIONS OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP TO THE EU ON TURKISH-US RELATIONS
America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion; it would expose the "clash of civilizations" as a passing myth of history. States has long had an exceptionally close security and foreign policy relationship with Turkey, as well as a very close partnership with the European Union. As Turkey moves nearer to EU membership, both of these relationships will change. Yet, how they change, and what the implications of Turkish membership to the EU will be on Turkish-US relations, is far from clear.
In this context, finding an answer to the question "whether Turkish-American relations are well placed to face current challenges and benefit from the opportunities of this temporary complexity" is important. The best answer lies in the history of Turkish-American partnership.
Therefore, this part of the paper points out the background of the Turkish-American relationship, namely strategic partnership, with emphasis on recent developments, and attests that this partnership has a lot to offer in terms of building a safer and better future for Turkey, the United States, the EU, the transatlantic community and beyond. The European Union gave Turkey a definite date for accession negotiations; however, it did not provide a definite membership perspective. This issue, which was overshadowed by the Cyprus debates, may cause trouble for the EU process in the medium run. Turkey will be able to begin negotiations in October after the Additional Protocol, to include the 10 new member states, is enforced.
OUTLINES OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Some articles pushed Turkey's membership into uncertainty. One of them was that the "Negotiations by their nature are an open-ended process, whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand," in spite of the emphasis that the common purpose is full membership.
The expression, "It should be ensured that candidate states are fully bound to European structures as much as possible," is another issue, which attracted attention. Those annotations, so far, have only referred to Turkey. For instance, it was not used for Croatia, which obtained a date along with Turkey, at the Brussels Summit. 40 Secondly, it is said that for Turkey, before membership, "Long transition processes, derogations, original amendments and permanent safeguards, in other words, maintaining permanent conditions to form a basis for protection measures, may be considered." 41 Such issues should in deed be dealt with during the negotiations. Mentioning "permanent safeguards" in issues such as free movement, agriculture and regional funding is equivalent to not treating Turkey as an equal member. If uncertainties grow, they might make Turkey lose its desire in the reform process and prevent it from taking bold steps towards change.
Given the Brussels Resolution, It is obvious that a date to begin accession talks is not the same as a date for membership. Agreement to begin accession talks carries with it the presumption that the talks will be successful and the results will be ratified by all existing (25) members. Turkey is likely to experience a lengthy and perhaps contentious negotiation. French President Jacques Chirac, for example, has predicted a process that could be "as long as 20
years" while Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot suggested after the summit that it was "possible that Turkey would never achieve accession." 42 Nevertheless, Turkish Prime Minister
Erdogan states that the collapse of the EU effort is "not the end of the world" and that Turkey could continue with its reform process by "redesigning" the EU's Copenhagen criteria as "the Ankara criteria,"
Considering the ambiguity of the accession process Turkey will surely find time and energy to balance its deepening commitment to the EU with its important strategic relationship with the United States. The tensions, which have recently arisen in the US-Turkish relationship while Turkey was focusing on the EU summit, have not undermined the fundamental basis of the bilateral relationship. "However, it remains to be seen whether Ankara will be able to utilize the declarations of continued US support for Turkish accession to the EU to build a new and stable triangular relationship involving Brussels and Washington at the core of its future foreign policy and security framework." 43 This task is likely to prove particularly difficult in view of the current strains in the transatlantic relationship.
Cyprus Issue
The most important impediment for starting the negotiations looks like Greek Cypriots who will technically be able to exercise their veto at the beginning and end of each section of the negotiations. Despite the Greek Cypriots saying "no" in the April 24 referendum and using their veto power to block packages aimed at ending the isolation of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the EU has remained silent so far. Besides its silence, the EU has also linked the start of negotiations with Turkey on October 3 to the condition of a de facto recognition of Greek Cyprus. Brussels now takes Ankara's concerns lightly with the answer, "but the Greek
Cypriots are already part of our family." 44 The EU's Cyprus policy, since April 24, has not given hope for the upcoming process.
Considering the Greek Cypriots being included in the EU family, and Greece and some countries that object to Turkey's membership rallying around Papadopoulos, it thus appears that Washington should play a major role in this critical process. The greatest part of the persuasion process, in which the EU should also take part, will be left to the United States. In the thorny path towards the resolution of this dispute, the US has a critical role to play. Only a clear and definite attitude from the United States would set Papadopoulos into action.
The PKK Issue
The continued PKK presence in northern Iraq is an embarrassment to the United States, which declared a global war against all kind of terror at the aftermath of September 11. The
United States assumed legal responsibility as occupying power for the territory of Iraq. "That a terrorist group -listed as such by the State Department since such designations were first made -operated with impunity from an area under U.S. responsibility undercuts the moral authority of the White House in waging the global war on terrorism." 46 While even Iran, allegedly a rogue state, has declared the PKK a terrorist organization and shut them down, it is very hard to understand why the U.S. takes no action against that bloody tyrant organization. States has long been a strong advocate of Turkish accession to the EU, in the belief that membership is in the long-term interests of all the parties." 50 The accession of Turkey to the EU will change its relations with the U.S. and the EU, and these changes will not always be easy for the United States, Europe, or Turkey to manage. It is a fact that the sense of rivalry has emerged between Brussels and Washington with Iraq being only the first major rift. Yet, Turkey is not a part of this divergence and should not to be compelled to make some difficult choices between these two so-called rivals. Some American elite claim that in the coming decades there will be a sharp divergence between the U.S. and EU strategic interests. However, this perception is likely to be the end of the Atlantic Alliance, and causes unpredictable risks for the global stability and peace.
Over the course of 2003, particularly due to the differences over the developments in Iraq, The future of the Turkey-EU-US trilateral relationship is likely to be characterized by an overlapping of reciprocal interests. From a Turkish perspective, pursuing a single-minded emphasis on developing relations either with the US or the EU will not be a rational approach.
In fact, developing close relations among these major entities is likely to have positive profits for each side respectively. Turkey's membership in the EU is not incompatible with simultaneously close relations with the United States. It is important to recall that Turkish accession would be an indispensable opportunity for trilateral alliance to overcome the instability in the region.
Turkey's geopolitical situation still encourages maintaining its strategic ties with the United
States, however, its economic ties will grow stronger with the EU.
This trilateral relationship will inherently experience a significant transformation.
Deepening relations with the EU requires a parallel deepening of the reform process. American support is not likely to generate smooth progress towards EU membership in the absence of radical commitment and implementation of economic and political reforms. Deepening relations with the EU, in turn, will offer Turkey the prospect of reconstituting its relations with the United
States, which will be more in line with its national interests and which will also enable it to play a more constructive role in the broader Middle East.
Turkish accession is beneficial for the larger transatlantic relationship, the United States, Europe Union, and Turkey itself. The U.S. and the EU both should avoid viewing this as an issue of "losing or gaining Turkey". Although the integration of Turkey into the EU encompasses some complexities, the strategic advantages of accession should not to be neglected, both for European interests. Indeed, as a member of a broader entity such as the EU, rather than an isolated middle power in itself, and acting in co-operation with the United States, Turkey is more likely to play a constructive role in this respect.
CONCLUSION
The threats to peace and security in our world are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and unpredictable. Hidden, asymmetric threats are forcing the world's nations to re-evaluate their strategies for defending themselves. Among them, terrorism stands out as the most destructive and menacing evil. In the post-September 11 world, humankind is trying to defend itself and its values against the sources of terror. In such a volatile environment, Europe
can not sustain its tranquility as such without taking bold steps. It has to move forward in its creative endeavors to bring greater stability and peace to other parts of the world. Increased momentum towards regional cooperation and integration is of crucial importance. In this task
Turkey has a crucial importance with its deep hinterland and unique web of relations in the heart of Eurasia.
As a candidate country Turkey has been particularly careful to conduct a foreign policy compatible with EU positions. This was acknowledged by the European Commission in its Progress Report 2003, which states that "Turkey has continued to position its foreign and security policy in line with that of the European Union" and that it "has played a constructive role within the framework of the CFSP". Turkey could have the strongest impact, strengthening the Union's focus on regions in its southeast neighborhood included in the Union's new Wider
Europe concept because of their vital importance for Europe's security.
As a member, Turkey would play a prominent role in the efforts of the EU to become a global actor through a robust Common Foreign, and Security Policy particularly in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey's close historical and cultural ties with the countries of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East serve to facilitate its constructive role towards contributing to stability and conciliation in these regions. Consequently, stability in the Balkans, the peace process and reform in the context of the broader Middle East, developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Azeri-Armenian dispute are among many issues that dominate Turkey's foreign policy considerations. Turkey can bring an important insight to policies to be formulated by the EU towards these regions.
Turkey will be instrumental in contributing to the objectives of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) since it has land and sea borders, as well as close cultural, economic and historical ties with a great many of the ENP partner countries. This is particularly valid for the implementation of the ENP in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey can also contribute to the EU policies as a strong advocate of reform and transformation for greater political and Turkey and the EU, should not lead to the misleading interpretation that Turkey will be able to achieve smooth and rapid progress towards EU membership in the absence of US support.
The temporary setback in Turkey-US relations can be restored, and the triangular relationship involving Turkey, the EU and the US can be reconstituted on a stronger basis.
However, the security-based strategy which depends solely on the alliance with the United
States and its diplomatic influence on Europe will not necessarily create the desired outcome for Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey should undertake and properly implement the required reforms as cited in Copenhagen criteria. In other words, American help could not act as a substitute for reforms in the context of Turkey-EU relations.
Although the EU gave Turkey a definite date to begin negotiations to enter the European Union, there is still considerable uncertainty in certain circles in Europe concerning Turkish membership. An isolated Turkey without American backing may find itself confronted with further delays in its quest to become an EU member. The US influence may also ultimately be critical in resolving the Cyprus dispute, which constitutes the single most important barrier on Turkey's path to EU membership. Furthermore, failure to reconstitute the strategic relationship with the US may prevent Turkey from playing an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq in particular and shaping developments in broader Middle East in general. Thus, while giving priority to its European quest, it is also critical for Turkey to mend its ties with the US.
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